Iraq Sanctions - Revision history

96.231.2.80 at 15:42, 7 December 2012

2012-12-07T15:42:46Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:42, 7 December 2012
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	9/15/1998: Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State, claims “the Security Council resolutions provide in very specific terms for the lifting of sanctions when Iraq has fully complied with all the Security Council resolutions.”		9/15/1998: Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State, claims “the Security Council resolutions provide in very specific terms for the lifting of sanctions when Iraq has fully complied with all the Security Council resolutions.”

	11/~~101998~~: State Department spokesperson James Rubin states that sanctions will not be altered until after Iraq complies with U.N. resolutions “…including on Kuwaiti prisoners, Kuwaiti equipment, and, in short, demonstrating his peaceful intentions…” Later, Rubin states: “The Security Council has set out a very simple path to resolve this situation. And all it requires is him doing what he agreed to do, cooperating with UNSCOM…” [http://www.accuracy.org/release/157-iraq-sanctions-whats-the-policy/]		11/10/1998: State Department spokesperson James Rubin states that sanctions will not be altered until after Iraq complies with U.N. resolutions “…including on Kuwaiti prisoners, Kuwaiti equipment, and, in short, demonstrating his peaceful intentions…” Later, Rubin states: “The Security Council has set out a very simple path to resolve this situation. And all it requires is him doing what he agreed to do, cooperating with UNSCOM…” [http://www.accuracy.org/release/157-iraq-sanctions-whats-the-policy/]

96.231.2.80 at 16:59, 4 December 2012

2012-12-04T16:59:39Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:59, 4 December 2012
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	~~April~~ 3, 1991: U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 687. It includes many demands but states that once Iraq complies with the weapons inspection regime, the sanctions “shall have no further force or effect.”		4/3/1991: U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 687. It includes many demands but states that once Iraq complies with the weapons inspection regime, the sanctions “shall have no further force or effect.”

	~~May~~ 20, 1991: James Baker, Secretary of State: “We are not interested in seeing a relaxation of sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein is in power.”		5/20/1991: James Baker, Secretary of State: “We are not interested in seeing a relaxation of sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein is in power.”

	~~January~~ 13, 1993: Incoming President Clinton: “If he [Hussein] wants a different relationship with the United States and the United Nations, all he has to do is change his behavior.”		1/13/1993: Incoming President Clinton: “If he [Hussein] wants a different relationship with the United States and the United Nations, all he has to do is change his behavior.”

	~~January~~ 14, 1993: Clinton backtracks: “There is no difference between my policy and the policy of the present Administration…. I have no intention of normalizing relations with him.”		1/14/1993: Clinton backtracks: “There is no difference between my policy and the policy of the present Administration…. I have no intention of normalizing relations with him.”

	~~January~~ 12, 1995: While inspections were taking place, Ambassador Madeleine Albright said the U.S. was “determined to oppose any modification of the sanctions regime until Iraq has moved to comply with all its outstanding obligations.” She specifically cited the return of Kuwaiti weaponry and non-military equipment.		1/12/1995: While inspections were taking place, Ambassador Madeleine Albright said the U.S. was “determined to oppose any modification of the sanctions regime until Iraq has moved to comply with all its outstanding obligations.” She specifically cited the return of Kuwaiti weaponry and non-military equipment.

	~~March~~ 26, 1997: Albright, in her first major foreign policy address as Secretary of State: “We do not agree with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted. Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions…. And the evidence is overwhelming that Saddam Hussein’s intentions will never be peaceful.”		3/26/1997: Albright, in her first major foreign policy address as Secretary of State: “We do not agree with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted. Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions…. And the evidence is overwhelming that Saddam Hussein’s intentions will never be peaceful.”

	~~November~~ 14, 1997: Clinton: [When Iraq broke the inspections regime] “What he has just done is to ensure that the sanctions will be there until the end of time or as long as he lasts.”		11/14/1997: Clinton: [When Iraq broke the inspections regime] “What he has just done is to ensure that the sanctions will be there until the end of time or as long as he lasts.”

	~~November~~ 14, 1997: National Security Adviser Sandy Berger: “He can’t be in compliance if he’s thrown the UNSCOM people out. So it’s a necessary condition. It may not be a sufficient condition.”		11/14/1997: National Security Adviser Sandy Berger: “He can’t be in compliance if he’s thrown the UNSCOM people out. So it’s a necessary condition. It may not be a sufficient condition.”

	~~December~~ 16, 1997: Clinton on Hussein’s actions: “I think that he felt probably that the United States would never vote to lift the sanctions on him no matter what he did…”		12/16/1997: Clinton on Hussein’s actions: “I think that he felt probably that the United States would never vote to lift the sanctions on him no matter what he did…”

	~~August~~ 20, 1997: Ambassador Bill Richardson: “Sanctions may stay on in perpetuity.”		8/20/1997: Ambassador Bill Richardson: “Sanctions may stay on in perpetuity.”

	~~September~~ 15, 1998: Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State, claims “the Security Council resolutions provide in very specific terms for the lifting of sanctions when Iraq has fully complied with all the Security Council resolutions.”		9/15/1998: Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State, claims “the Security Council resolutions provide in very specific terms for the lifting of sanctions when Iraq has fully complied with all the Security Council resolutions.”

	~~November 10, 1998~~: State Department spokesperson James Rubin states that sanctions will not be altered until after Iraq complies with U.N. resolutions “…including on Kuwaiti prisoners, Kuwaiti equipment, and, in short, demonstrating his peaceful intentions…” Later, Rubin states: “The Security Council has set out a very simple path to resolve this situation. And all it requires is him doing what he agreed to do, cooperating with UNSCOM…” [http://www.accuracy.org/release/157-iraq-sanctions-whats-the-policy/]		11/101998: State Department spokesperson James Rubin states that sanctions will not be altered until after Iraq complies with U.N. resolutions “…including on Kuwaiti prisoners, Kuwaiti equipment, and, in short, demonstrating his peaceful intentions…” Later, Rubin states: “The Security Council has set out a very simple path to resolve this situation. And all it requires is him doing what he agreed to do, cooperating with UNSCOM…” [http://www.accuracy.org/release/157-iraq-sanctions-whats-the-policy/]

96.231.2.80: Created page with "April 3, 1991: U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 687. It includes many demands but states that once Iraq complies with the weapons inspection regime, the sanctions “sh..."

2012-12-04T16:21:29Z

Created page with "April 3, 1991: U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 687. It includes many demands but states that once Iraq complies with the weapons inspection regime, the sanctions “sh..."

New page

April 3, 1991: U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 687. It includes many demands but states that once Iraq complies with the weapons inspection regime, the sanctions “shall have no further force or effect.”

May 20, 1991: James Baker, Secretary of State: “We are not interested in seeing a relaxation of sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein is in power.”

January 13, 1993: Incoming President Clinton: “If he [Hussein] wants a different relationship with the United States and the United Nations, all he has to do is change his behavior.”

January 14, 1993: Clinton backtracks: “There is no difference between my policy and the policy of the present Administration…. I have no intention of normalizing relations with him.”

January 12, 1995: While inspections were taking place, Ambassador Madeleine Albright said the U.S. was “determined to oppose any modification of the sanctions regime until Iraq has moved to comply with all its outstanding obligations.” She specifically cited the return of Kuwaiti weaponry and non-military equipment.

March 26, 1997: Albright, in her first major foreign policy address as Secretary of State: “We do not agree with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted. Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions…. And the evidence is overwhelming that Saddam Hussein’s intentions will never be peaceful.”

November 14, 1997: Clinton: [When Iraq broke the inspections regime] “What he has just done is to ensure that the sanctions will be there until the end of time or as long as he lasts.”

November 14, 1997: National Security Adviser Sandy Berger: “He can’t be in compliance if he’s thrown the UNSCOM people out. So it’s a necessary condition. It may not be a sufficient condition.”

December 16, 1997: Clinton on Hussein’s actions: “I think that he felt probably that the United States would never vote to lift the sanctions on him no matter what he did…”

August 20, 1997: Ambassador Bill Richardson: “Sanctions may stay on in perpetuity.”

September 15, 1998: Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State, claims “the Security Council resolutions provide in very specific terms for the lifting of sanctions when Iraq has fully complied with all the Security Council resolutions.”

November 10, 1998: State Department spokesperson James Rubin states that sanctions will not be altered until after Iraq complies with U.N. resolutions “…including on Kuwaiti prisoners, Kuwaiti equipment, and, in short, demonstrating his peaceful intentions…” Later, Rubin states: “The Security Council has set out a very simple path to resolve this situation. And all it requires is him doing what he agreed to do, cooperating with UNSCOM…” [http://www.accuracy.org/release/157-iraq-sanctions-whats-the-policy/]