Robert McNamara: Difference between revisions
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== On Iraq== | |||
== McNamara is the former Secretary of Defense, under President Kennedy and Johnson | McNamara is the former Secretary of Defense, under President Kennedy and Johnson. McNamara was one of the primary architects of the Vietnam War. He has since said waging that war was wrong and has criticized the war in Iraq. | ||
McNamara was one of the primary architects of the Vietnam War. He has since said waging that war was wrong and has criticized the war in Iraq. | |||
"We're misusing our influence. It's just wrong what we're doing. It's morally wrong, it's politically wrong, it's economically wrong." In 2004 about Iraq War. [[http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=103x31371]] | "We're misusing our influence. It's just wrong what we're doing. It's morally wrong, it's politically wrong, it's economically wrong." In 2004 about Iraq War. [[http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=103x31371]] | ||
Latest revision as of 11:12, 17 June 2015
On Iraq[edit]
McNamara is the former Secretary of Defense, under President Kennedy and Johnson. McNamara was one of the primary architects of the Vietnam War. He has since said waging that war was wrong and has criticized the war in Iraq.
"We're misusing our influence. It's just wrong what we're doing. It's morally wrong, it's politically wrong, it's economically wrong." In 2004 about Iraq War. [[1]]
"There have been times in the last year when I was just utterly disgusted by our position, the United States' position vis-à-vis the other nations of the world." In 2004 about Iraq War [[2]]
On Nuclear Arm Proliferation[edit]
"At the risk of appearing simplistic and provocative, I would characterize current U.S. nuclear weapons policy as immoral, illegal, militarily unnecessary, and dreadfully dangerous. The risk of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear launch is unacceptably high. Far from reducing these risks, this administration is committed to keeping the U.S. nuclear arsenal as a mainstay of its military power—a commitment that is simultaneously eroding the international norms that have limited the spread of nuclear weapons and fissile materials for 50 years."
"What is shocking is that today, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, the basic U.S. nuclear policy is unchanged. It has not adapted to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Plans and procedures have not been revised to make the United States or other countries less likely to push the button. At a minimum, we should remove all strategic nuclear weapons from “hair-trigger” alert, as others have recommended, including Gen. George Lee Butler, the last commander of the Strategic Air Command. That simple change would greatly reduce the risk of an accidental nuclear launch. It would also signal to other States that the United States is taking steps to end its reliance on nuclear weapons."
"What I mean to say there is that there is no military utility for nuclear weapons today by any nation other than to deter one’s opponents from their use, and if one’s opponent does not have nuclear weapons there’s no military utility whatsoever. That’s the first point; the second point is that even if one’s opponent has nuclear weapons, there’s no possible justification for initiating their use against a nuclear State; it would be suicidal. And there’s no possible justification for using them against a non-nuclear State, it would be morally reprehensible and politically indefensible. So the nuclear powers have to think through their justification for their nuclear weapons completely. If they were to do so, I think they would arrive at the same conclusion as I have, that we should eliminate, or nearly eliminate, all nuclear weapons. That’s the bottom line of my decision."
-2005 [[3]]